

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**

**v.**

**Criminal Action No. 1:11CR3**

**DAVID F. HITCHNER, III,**

**Defendant.**

**ORDER/OPINION REGARDING PLEA OF GUILTY**

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by the District Court for purposes of conducting proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Defendant, David F. Hitchner, III, in person and by counsel, Ailynn Orteza, appeared before me on March 28, 2011. The Government appeared by John C. Parr, its Assistant United States Attorney.

The Court determined that Defendant was prepared to enter a plea of “Guilty” to Count One of the Indictment. Thereupon, the Court proceeded with the Rule 11 proceeding by first placing Defendant under oath. The Court then determined that Defendant’s plea was pursuant to a written plea agreement, and asked the Government to tender the original to the Court. The Court then asked counsel for the Government to summarize the written Plea Agreement. Defendant then stated that the agreement as summarized by counsel for the Government was correct and complied with his understanding of the agreement. The Court **ORDERED** the written Plea Agreement filed.

The Court next inquired of Defendant concerning his understanding of his right to have an Article III Judge hear the entry of his guilty plea and his understanding of the difference between an Article III Judge and a Magistrate Judge. Defendant thereafter stated in open court that he voluntarily waived his right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept his plea and voluntarily

consented to the undersigned Magistrate Judge hearing and accepting his plea, and tendered to the Court a written Waiver of Article III Judge and Consent To Enter Guilty Plea Before Magistrate Judge, which waiver and consent was signed by Defendant and countersigned by Defendant's counsel and was concurred in by the signature of the Assistant United States Attorney appearing.

Upon consideration of the sworn testimony of Defendant, as well as the representations of his counsel and the representations of the Government, the Court finds that the oral and written waiver of Article III Judge and consent to enter guilty plea before a Magistrate Judge was freely and voluntarily given and the written waiver and consent was freely and voluntarily executed by Defendant, David F. Hitchner, III, only after having had his rights fully explained to him and having a full understanding of those rights through consultation with his counsel, as well as through questioning by the Court. The Court **ORDERED** the written Waiver and Consent to Enter Guilty Plea before a Magistrate Judge filed and made part of the record.

The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant Count One of the Indictment, including the elements the United States would have to prove at trial, charging him with conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(b)(1)(D).

The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant Count One of the Indictment, the statutory penalties applicable to an individual adjudicated guilty of the felony charge contained in Count One of the Indictment, the impact of the sentencing guidelines on sentencing in general, and inquired of Defendant as to his competency to proceed with the plea hearing. From said review the undersigned Magistrate Judge determined Defendant understood the nature of the charge pending against him and understood the possible statutory maximum sentence which could be imposed upon his conviction or adjudication of guilty on that charge was imprisonment for a term of five (5) years; understood that a fine of not more than \$250,000.00 could be imposed; understood that both fine and

imprisonment could be imposed; understood he would be subject to a period of at least two (2) years of supervised release; and understood the Court would impose a special mandatory assessment of \$100.00 for the felony conviction payable on or before the date of sentencing. He also understood that his sentence could be increased if he had prior firearm offense, violent felony conviction, or prior drug conviction. He also understood he might be required by the Court to pay the costs of his incarceration and supervised release.

The undersigned also reviewed with Defendant his conditional waiver of appellate rights as follows:

Ct: Did you and Ms. Orteza discuss that you have a right to appeal your conviction and sentence to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals within 14 days of the Judge's oral announcement of your sentence?

Def: Yes.

Ct: Did you and Ms. Orteza discuss that you may have right to challenge the sentence and how it was imposed using a writ of habeas corpus-type motion under 28 USC section 2255?

Def: Yes.

Ct: Did you and Ms. Orteza discuss that as stated in paragraph 11 of your plea agreement, if the District Judge sentences you to a sentence of incarceration of 12 months or less you give up your right to appeal to the Fourth Circuit and you give up your right to collaterally attack or challenge that sentence using habeas?

Def: Yes.

Ct: Is that what you intended to do?

Def: Yes.

From the foregoing colloquy the undersigned determined that Defendant understood his appellate rights and knowingly gave up those rights pursuant to the condition contained in the written plea bargain agreement.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge further examined Defendant relative to his knowledgeable and voluntary execution of the written plea bargain agreement, and determined the entry into said written plea bargain agreement was both knowledgeable and voluntary on the part of Defendant. The undersigned then inquired of Defendant regarding his understanding of the written plea agreement. Defendant stated he understood the terms of the written plea agreement and also stated that it contained the whole of his agreement with the Government and no promises or representations were made to him by the Government other than those terms contained in the written plea agreement.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge further inquired of Defendant, his counsel, and the Government as to the non-binding recommendations and stipulation contained in the written plea bargain agreement and determined that Defendant understood, with respect to the plea bargain agreement and to Defendant's entry of a plea of guilty to the felony charge contained in Count One of the Indictment, the undersigned Magistrate Judge would write the subject Order and would further order a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the probation officer attending the District Court. The undersigned advised the Defendant that the District Judge would adjudicate the Defendant guilty of the felony charged under Count One of the Indictment. Only after the District Court had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence investigation report, would the District Court make a determination as to whether to accept or reject any recommendation or stipulation contained within the plea agreement or pre-sentence report. The undersigned reiterated to the Defendant that the District Judge may not agree with the recommendations or stipulation contained in the written agreement. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further advised Defendant, in accord with Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, that in the event the District Court Judge refused to follow the non-binding recommendations or stipulation contained in the written plea agreement and/or sentenced him to a sentence which was different from that which he expected, he would not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant and his counsel each acknowledged their understanding and Defendant maintained his desire to have his plea of guilty accepted.

Defendant also understood that his actual sentence could not be calculated until after a pre-sentence report was prepared and a sentencing hearing conducted. The undersigned also advised, and Defendant stated that he understood, that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and that, even if the District Judge did not follow the Sentencing Guidelines or sentenced him to a higher sentence than he expected, he would not have a right to withdraw his guilty plea.. Defendant further understood there was no parole in the federal system, although he may be able to earn institutional good time, and that good time was not controlled by the Court, but by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Thereupon, Defendant, David F. Hitchner, III, with the consent of his counsel, Ailynn Orteza, proceeded to enter a verbal plea of **GUILTY** to the felony charge contained in Count One of the Indictment.

The Court then heard the testimony of Fairmont Police Department Detective Sergeant Doug Yost, who testified he is also assigned as a member of the Three Rivers Drug Task Force. In June 2010, he was involved in the investigation of a shooting incident in Fairmont, West Virginia. A 911 call advised that a subject had been shot in the 300 block of Corey Avenue. The investigation showed the incident involved two houses, 307 and 309 Corey Avenue, one of which houses was Defendant's. The investigation also showed the incident began at the other house, where a Ms. Sanders resided. Sanders was previously robbed. After the robbery, she and an individual named

Watson gave Defendant two pounds of marijuana to hold for them in his house. Defendant had the marijuana in a black shirt in his basement. An individual first went to Sanders' house to steal marijuana. Eventually, the individual went to Defendant's house to steal the marijuana. The individual had a gun. Defendant grabbed the gun and shot the individual in self-defense. In investigating the shooting officers found the two pounds of marijuana in Defendant's basement. At first both Defendant and Sanders said they had no idea where the marijuana came from, but eventually Defendant made a statement that he had received the marijuana from Sanders and Watson to hold for them so Watson could redistribute it.

Defendant stated he heard, understood, and did not disagree with Sgt. Yost's testimony regarding his own actions. The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge concludes the offense charged in Count One of the Indictment is supported by an independent basis in fact concerning each of the essential elements of such offense. That independent basis is provided by the testimony of Sgt. Yost.

Upon consideration of all of the above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; Defendant is aware of and understood his right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept his plea and elected to voluntarily consent to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge hearing and accepting his plea; Defendant understood the charges against him, not only as to the Indictment as a whole, but in particular as to Count One of the Indictment; Defendant understood the consequences of his plea of guilty, in particular the maximum statutory penalty to which he would be exposed; Defendant understood his waiver of appellate rights explained this date; Defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to Count One of the Indictment; and Defendant's plea is independently supported by the

testimony of Sgt. Yost, which provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of each of the essential elements of the charge to which Defendant has pled guilty.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge therefore **ACCEPTS** Defendant's plea of guilty to the felony charge contained Count One of the Indictment and recommends he be adjudged guilty on said charge as contained in Count One of the Indictment and have sentence imposed accordingly.

The undersigned further directs that a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the adult probation officer assigned to this case.

Defendant is continued in the custody of the United States Marshal pending further proceedings in this matter.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record.

DATED: March 30, 2011

*John S. Kaul*

JOHN S. KAULL  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE